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The impact of the global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 on private pension assets has 
been severe. Asset prices crashed on a scale not seen since the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
The OECD estimates that global assets accumulated to finance retirement fell by 20-25% over 
2008. Ireland felt the greatest impact, where pension assets fell by around 35%, but the United 
States was close behind with an estimated decline of 25-30%, followed by falls of around 20% in 
Canada and Australia (Antolin & Stewart 2009). Individual pension accumulations felt the brunt 
of the impact: in the United States, the average defined contribution plan balance fell by 16%, 
from $31,800 in 2007 to $26,578 by mid 2009 (Copeland 2009). 
This period of widespread losses and uncertainty coincides with worldwide moves 
towards individual pension accounts. The new pension systems transfer the risk and 
responsibility of retirement saving and investment decisions from plan sponsors to individuals. 
And the new choice burden is heavy: Australian employees, for example, must (subject to the 
availability of default options) decide on investment of their mandatory retirement savings 
contributions, choosing from up to 2000 managed funds (APRA 2009). Swedish retirement 
savers must choose from over 750 mutual funds, and US 401(k) plan participants also have to 
make allocations to asset classes and managers. These pension systems will work efficiently 
only if individuals are able to make investment allocations in their own best interest. 
Investment risk is a key element of these decisions. Retirement welfare depends on how 
risk is explained by pension providers, how it is understood, and how it is managed in 
portfolios, but economic and financial turmoil may impinge on any of these important 
processes. 
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Standard finance theory views the investment decision as a straight forward trade-off 
between risk and return, where the ‘rate of exchange’ depends on (usually constant) aversion to 
risk. The economic agent is assumed to correctly understand stochastic assets returns and the 
benefits of diversification, and is able to calculate an allocation that maximizes utility. In a 
choice experiment conducted during the relative economic calm of March 2007 (Bateman, 
Louviere, Thorp, Islam & Satchell 2009), we tested the extent to which retirement savers 
followed these predictions. Results differed significantly among investors of different ages and 
income levels: younger investors were more often conventionally risk averse whereas some 
groups of older, higher income individuals reacted positively to both higher returns and 
increasing risk. We presented risk as a widening range of possible investment outcomes, a 
highly rated way of conveying risk information (Vlaev, Chater & Stewart 2009). 
Here, we aim to evaluate the impact of severe market shocks on investor risk tolerance 
and investment choice by repeating the choice experiment during the turbulent and gloomy 
conditions experienced in October 2008, immediately following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers and sharp declines in world equity values.
 1
 We are interested in whether changes to 
the external environmental between the 2007 and 2008 surveys cause people to revise 
overoptimistic decisions or to exhibit myopic loss aversion in crisis-period choices, even 
though the information set within the experiment stays constant.  
Specifically, we use survey responses to estimate preferences for risk and return among 
(latent) groups of respondents and also to directly infer the cross-section of risk aversion for 
each survey sample so that, by comparing results for 2007 and 2008, we can detect changes in 
preferences caused by the external crisis. 
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From the perspective of conventional theory, we might expect different investment 
choices in tranquility and crisis if risk aversion is non-constant and/or if large asset-price shocks 
lead individuals to change their subjective views on asset returns. Further, some risk preference 
measures vary with levels of wealth. On the other hand, behavioral researchers have noted the 
propensity for investors to exhibit overconfidence and over optimism in bull markets 
(Kahneman & Riepe 1998) and to exhibit myopic loss aversion (Benartzi & Thaler 1995), 
behaviors which can also explain swings in portfolio choice during and after crises.  
Numerous studies have been conducted to understand and elicit risk aversion. These fall 
into several categories: laboratory studies of lottery-choice decisions using, for example, the 
experimental design of Holt and Laury (2002), analysis of survey data on real financial 
behavior to estimate risk aversion empirically (see, for example Ameriks & Zeldes 2004; 
Gerrans & Clark-Murphy 2004), experimental surveys of hypothetical investment choice 
decisions (see Bateman et al. 2009), as well as the analysis of responses to risk profiling 
questionnaires (Hallahan, Faff & McKenzie 2003). Age and income dominate as key 
determinants of risk tolerance (Bateman et al. 2009; Clark & Strauss 2008), although some 
studies also find significant effects from gender and wealth (Speelman, Clark-Murphy & 
Gerrans 2007, Hallahan et al. 2003). Our study contributes to this literature by assessing, in a 
controlled way, the impact of external events  
Plan providers, public regulators and researchers are particularly concerned about how 
investment choice menus are constructed and composed and what factors may influence 
individuals’ decisions (Agnew & Szykman 2005; Benartzi & Thaler 2007). Findings indicate 
characteristics of menus and personal and demographic characteristics are often important, 
while behavioral research contends that individuals faced with complex decisions may 
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demonstrate over-confidence or other biases, or rely on rules of thumb (Tversky & Kahneman 
1974; Benartzi, Peleg & Thaler 2009). We contribute to this expanding debate on retirement 
savings choice design by evaluating the impact of demographics and design features on stated 
preferences. 
In the next section we outline the experimental design, describe the samples and 
introduce relevant theory.   
Method 
Except for the economy-wide economic and financial conditions and the sample of 
respondents, the web-based experimental surveys we conducted in 2007 and 2008 were identical 
in design and presentation of investment choices.  
Sample, Presentation and Design 
The online web panel provider, PureProfile recruited two samples of individuals aged 18-
65 on our behalf: 819 people in March 2007 and 919 in October 2008. Each sample was 
constructed to match demographic patterns of the Australian population (aged 18-65) which 
explains the slightly different sample sizes. PureProfile invited selected members of their 
300,000 household panel to join the survey by email or via their website, informed respondents 
that this was a university project, and paid those who completed the survey a nominal sum of 
$4.20.  
Individual retirement savings coverage is mandatory for all Australian employees aged 
18-65 who earn at least 9% of average earnings, so almost all adults are familiar with the broad 
structure of the pension arrangements. Before making their investment choices, respondents read 
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a brief explanation (Appendix 1) of the investments offered. Participants also answered questions 
about personal circumstances and demographics, and completed a risk profiling questionnaire 
designed as a financial planning tool by a major pension provider. Scores from the profiling 




Sample demographics and risk profiling 
Demographics: By design, the demographic features of our samples are largely 
unchanged between the two surveys (Table 1). The genders are evenly represented and most 
respondents are partnered, have tertiary education, are full-time workers or students, own a car 
and a house, and hold investments or savings outside the pension system. Both samples include a 
good cross-section of ages. Large minorities are single, have secondary education only and do 
not own a home. In both samples almost a third classified their employment as professional or 
management, with the smallest occupational representations being tradespersons, laborers and 
transport workers. Around 60% of the sample reported income slightly below the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics measure of 60
th






[Insert Table 1 here] 
Risk profiling: Despite the sharp deterioration in economic conditions at the time of the 
2008 survey, the scores from the risk profiling questionnaire were almost identical in both sets of 
responses: around 76% of respondents scored in the middle range as ‘balanced’ with virtually 
no-one classified as ‘aggressive’ and very few ‘conservatives’. In fact the only demographic 
indicator of a change of attitudes between the 2007 and 2008 surveys can be seen in responses to 
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the question, ‘Do you own stocks and shares?’. The percentage of the sample who answered ‘no, 
but considering’ fell from 41 to 31 and the number responding ‘no, not interested’ rose from 16 
to 28 between 2007 and 2008. This suggests an intention to be wary of the stock market in the 
future among non-stock owners but not of ex post portfolio rebalancing by those already 
invested, since the number of respondents who owned stocks did not change significantly 
between the two samples. 
Design 
Subjects then chose from 16 tables of six investment options, indicating their ‘most 
likely’ and ‘least likely’ choices of investment option for  a(hypothetical) $1,000 pension 
(‘superannuation’) contribution.
4
 Five of the options differed by the proportion of equities and 
cash (ranging from 100 percent cash/0 percent equities to 75/25, 50/50, 25/75 and 0/100) while 
the sixth was a retirement savings account (RSA), which is similar to a bank account.
5
  
Attributes: The theoretically important characteristics of investment options are risk and 
return. We varied (gross) return, fees and risk for each option using a fractional factorial design 
for the choice sets, based on the L
^MA
 in Louviere, Hensher and Swait (2000). We fixed gross 
returns in every choice set at the median 10 year accumulation in (real) dollars for each option, 
but the investment management fees (% p.a.) and risk varied over four option-specific levels. 
(Table 2) 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Fees were an annual percentage of account balance. The complex fees charged on actual 
retirement savings accounts we summarize using a single ‘Investment management fee’ 
calibrated to the range of fees charged by retail providers of managed funds, with four levels for 
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each of the six investment options.
6
 This structure captures the higher fees charged by active 
equity managers. Changes to investment management fees interact with constant differences in 
the gross return for each portfolio to create variation in net returns. 
We described risk to respondents as a range bounded by the ‘likely worst case 
accumulation after 10 years’ and ‘likely best case accumulation after 10 years’. The four levels 
were quantile ranges from 10 year account values of the $1,000 investment: the extreme 
minimum and maximum of the empirical distribution, 5-95th, 10-90th and 20-80th quantile 
ranges. We used bootstrapped historical returns to construct the empirical distribution from 
which the quantiles could be drawn, by taking sufficient random draws from a monthly series for 
real returns to compound into a 10 year gross return, and repeating that procedure 5,000 times. 
The historical monthly returns series used for the bootstrap runs from July 1986 to March 2006 
and includes the 1987 stock market crash during which the equity price index fell around 40%, 
an event comparable in scale to the losses experienced in late 2008.
7 For estimation purposes, we 
inferred (annualized) portfolio variance for each range used in the choice sets by computing the 
volatility of the appropriate truncation of the bootstrapped returns distribution. 
There is no universally accepted method for presenting investment risk to retirement 
savers in pension fund prospectuses, and the ranges we use here are certainly not typical. Some 
pension funds simply label investments as ‘low’, ‘medium’ or ‘high risk’ while others suggest 
the risk attitude of the investor, such as ‘conservative’ or ‘aggressive’. Another common 
approach is to report the likely frequency of negative annual returns from some investment 
product over a fixed number of years. While most conventional measures focus only on the 
probability of losses, the range measure we use in these experiments shows extreme upside as 
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well as downside outcomes and incorporates empirically observed skewness. We go this way 
because expected utility theory treats both unexpected gains and losses as risk. Our choice of risk 
framing is supported by Vlaev et al. (2009) who find that that range presentation received the 
highest ranking and resulted in more stable risk preferences. 
Table 3 shows an example of a choice set.  
 [Insert Table 3 here] 
Theoretical Background 
The structure of our choice sets derives from basic finance theory where the investment decision 
as a straightforward trade-off between risk and return. 
Investment choices. In this context, consider a mean variance (MV) investor (i) with 
expected utility, iV , where 
2-i i i iV    (1)
 
Here, i  is the expected rate of return of investor i's investment portfolio, 
2
i  is his/her 
portfolio variance and i  is his/her risk parameter. Equation (1) is a certainty equivalent form for 
expected utility over wealth where 2i i  is the risk premium and 2 i is absolute risk aversion. 
Utility for each portfolio Vj, is a function of the portfolio option j return and variance 
which change first with the proportional exposure to stocks in each option, and then over four 
option-specific levels, as set out in Table 2. (For the time being we set aside the index i for an 
individual investor.) 
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( ) (1- ) - - [ ² ² 2 (1- ) (1- )² ²] j j j s j c j j j s j j sc j cV V                    (2) 
where j  is the proportion of the portfolio allocated to stocks, s  is the return to stocks, c is the 
return to cash, j  is the fee deducted from returns, ²s is the variance of stock returns, sc is the 
covariance between stocks and cash and ²c  is the variance of cash returns.
8
  
The investor chooses between the six options by comparing the expected utility of each 
and selecting the one with the highest utility and we can infer that k jV V  when the difference 
k jV V is positive.  
We can also compare each of the stock/cash portfolios with the constant choice. In our 
experiment this is the retirement savings account which is fixed and offered in every choice set. 
The difference in utility between options j=1,...,5 and the retirement savings account (portfolio 
option r)
9
 simplifies to 
 ( - ) [ (1- ) - ]- - [ ² ² 2 (1- ) (1- )² ²] j r s j c j r j j s j j sc j cV V                   (3) 
where rV  is the utility of the retirement savings account, and r  is the return to the retirement 
savings account. (There is no fee and no variability of return on the retirement savings account.) 
So we have two explanatory variables: net return, given by the term in the curly brackets in 
equation (3), which is excess return over the risk free rate, net of fees; and portfolio variance, 
given by the term in the square brackets. Individual variations in preferences appear in the risk 
parameter, i . 
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Using these data we estimate a discrete mixture model of preferences over risk and return 
conditioning on relevant demographics and compare with the predictions of mean-variance 
theory. 
Risk aversion. We can also use responses of individuals to map out the cross-section of 
risk aversion in our sample of investors. Conditioning on attribute levels and the proportions of 
shares and cash for each option j, we can infer a range of values for η for which it will be optimal 
for a respondent with risk aversion in that range to choose option j in each choice set. In other 













 ). If, for 
all comparisons between investment options by an individual in any given choice set one 
investment option dominates, ,k jV V k   , then the following inequality must hold, defining a 
maximum for risk aversion consistent with that ‘best’ choice: 
   
           
222 2 2 2[ 2 1 1 1 1 ]
s k j c j k j k
s k j sc k k j j c k j
       

          
    

        
 (4) 
As noted earlier, our repeated experiments follow a fractional factorial design based on 
the L
^MA
 approach in Louviere, Hensher and Swait (2000) which generates 64 distinct choice 
sets, 16 of which are presented to each respondent. Each choice set is offered around 200 times 
over the entire survey. As the proportions in stocks, j  and k , in each pair of options vary 
between zero and one, and as the option-specific attributes of net return and variance change 
between the four levels, we can use (4) to derive a series of inequalities that define ranges for η 
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for which each option k is preferred to all others in a choice set. Each of the 64 choice sets thus 
embeds an associated pattern of risk tolerance.  
By collecting the 16 best and worst choices of each respondent and mapping them into the 
risk pattern of the relevant choice sets, we can back out ranges for each respondent's risk 
aversion parameter i . These 16 individual ranges may or may not uniquely define an 
intersection: some respondent's choices produce non-intersecting ranges of risk tolerance and no 
well-defined range for i  emerges. Choices may be consistent with risk neutral and risk loving 
behavior, as well as with risk aversion. We can use these inferred risk aversion levels to compare 
responses between 2007 and 2008. 
Using our estimated model and direct inference we can compare investment choices and 




Table 4 shows the 13,104 best and worst choices for the March 2007 sample and the 
14,699 choices from the October 2008 sample. 
10
 
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
In the 2007 survey, the higher the proportion of shares in an option, the more often it 
option was chosen as ‘most likely’. More than 60% of best choices were allocated to the options 
with 75% or more in shares whereas the savings account and 100% cash options collectively 
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accounted for only 7%. Likewise, the savings account was the most common ‘worst’ choice 
(59% of least preferred choices), the 100% cash and share portfolios were least preferred in 12-
15% of observations, while the diversified portfolios were the least common ‘worst’ choices. 
The 2008 survey was conducted between 17-24 October, soon after the failure of Lehman 
Brothers and following a well-publicized 30% decline in Australia’s benchmark share price 
index (ASX200) over the previous two months. The Australian dollar had also depreciated very 
rapidly (around 30% against the USD over the course of a few weeks) and news media were 
dominated by reports of financial and economic crisis. In the gloomy environment, and after 
substantial reductions in the wealth of equity investors, preferences of respondents for high-risk 
allocations appeared to moderate. The 100% shares choices dropped by seven percentage points 
to around 26% of the sample, in favor of higher cash weightings, particularly the 50:50 
allocation, which increased by four percentage points to 23% of best selections. A 50:50 
allocation is sometimes chosen to minimize regret (Michenaud & Solnik 2005; Bell 1982; 
Loomes & Sugden 1982) but may also be an approximation to a ‘1/n’ rule (Benartzi & Thaler 
2001, Huberman & Jiang 2006). The 100% shares option also attracted six percentage points 
more worst choices in 2008, rising from 12% to 18%, and the RSA and 100% cash options were 
chosen as worst less frequently. Nonetheless, the investments with more than 75% in shares were 
still the most popular choices. 
At first glance, the raw data suggest two aspects of risk preferences worth investigating: 
first, respondents seem to show a strong preference for riskier investments, and second, risk 
preferences seem weaker at the time of the 2008-09 financial crisis. We address these questions 
by extracting information on risk preferences directly from individual choices, and then using 
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econometric modeling to estimate latent preferences classes, and testing the restriction that the 
parameters of the model are constant for 2007 and 2008. 
Inferred Risk Preference Patterns  
We present some observations on the risk preference patterns evident in the survey data 
beginning with an example. Take an individual at random from the 2008 survey. This particular 
respondent was presented with 16 choice sets, numbered 17-32 (out of a total of 64), each with a 














 ) and the second 







Two features of the experimental design are worth keeping in mind during this 
discussion: first, one or two of the six investment options in each choice set may be dominated 
by neighboring investment options at any risk aversion; and second, the risk range is not always 
increasing as the proportion of shares rises. We also impose an artificial boundary on the range 
of risk parameters. We choose an upper bound for risk aversion by calculating the value of the 
parameter at which it is optimal to choose the retirement savings account in every choice set, 
η=373. There is no similar lower bound for η at which it was optimal to choose the 100% shares 
option in every set. In other words, the 25:75 cash/shares portfolio (investment option 4) was 
always better than 100% shares (investment option 5) for risk-loving respondents in a proportion 
of the 64 choice sets, no matter how risk tolerant they were. For the affected choice sets, this 
dominance was evident from η = -15 so our measure of risk preference runs from           -
15≤η≤373 which corresponds to a range for absolute risk aversion range of -30≤2η≤746. 
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Most-preferred choices and risk preferences. Table 5 shows the values of 2η for which 
it is optimal to choose each option as ‘most preferred’ or ‘best’ in each of the 16 choice sets and 
the implied risk parameter associated with the choices of the example respondent. The 
respondent's best choices create an intersection over a narrow interval consistent with a risk 

















 for all k=1,...16 pairs  ij ij    implied by the respondent's choices 
and we call this their risk preference range. These choices define an interval  
*
ij ij 
  that is 
inside the ranges  ij ij    for all 16 choices.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Not everyone is so consistent. For the majority of respondents, we cannot define an 
intersection interval because their implied risk parameter ranges form discontinuous intervals. In 
fact, we can identify a well-defined risk parameter interval for only 14.8% of the sample 
(122/819 respondents) in 2007 and 11.8% of the sample (108/919 respondents) in 2008, using 
‘most likely’ choices. 
Remarkably, those who do choose consistently include a large number who show 
tendencies to risk loving choices. The median value of the midpoints of risk parameter intervals 
was negative in both years: -1 in 2007 and -0.5 in 2008. The first quartile is around -7(-7) and the 
third quartile begins around 2(67.5) for 2007(2008). The graph in Table 6, which presents 
distributions of midpoints of the risk parameter intervals for both 2007 and 2008, suggests that 
the cross-section of risk preferences is very wide. 
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For both samples, the correlations between inferred risk preference and age, gender, 
education and household income were insignificantly different from zero, but the correlation 
with the scores from the risk profiling questionnaire were significant and negative, indicating 
that the two methods of gauging risk tolerance may be inconsistent for some respondents. 
While many respondents in both samples appear to be strongly risk loving and may make 
choices that go against their risk profile, we do observe an increase in mean risk aversion in 2008 
over 2007 (marginally significant). This indicates a more general observable shift towards risk 
aversion across the distribution during the financial crisis (see Table 6). 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Least-preferred choices and risk preferences: For ‘least preferred’ or ‘worst’ choices 
there is much less natural variability in the choice sets and consequently less power to 
distinguish different tastes for risk (see Table 7). In this example of 16 choice sets, the retirement 
savings account (investment option 6) minimizes utility for the range of parameters we might 
think of as conventionally moderate risk aversion and is also worst for any respondent with risk 
neutral or risk loving preferences. At higher levels of risk aversion, the 100% shares portfolio 
(investment option 5) is most often worst. The choices we observe in Table 4 match up to this 
pattern in the design, with investment options 5 and 6 (25:75 cash/shares and 100% shares) 
collecting 17% (24%) of worst choices in 2007(08). Our example respondent chooses his/her 
least preferred option consistently with the risk parameter we inferred from his/her best choices, 
always selecting option 6 (the retirement savings account), and thus defining a range of risk 
aversion for worst choices -30≤2η≤4, which includes the best choices range -8≤2η≤-7. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
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A much larger proportion of the samples have ‘worst’ choice parameter ranges that are 
consistent (66% of both the 2007 and 2008 samples), but many of these fall into two distinct 
intervals as can be seen in the distributional graph in Table 8. The midpoint data are bimodal, 
grouped into those who choose the least, and those who choose the most, risky investments as 
worst, but this is almost surely an effect of the choice set design, as explained above. We can say 
little about the cross-section of risk preferences from these observations. However we do observe 
again a slight increase in risk aversion between the two surveys. In addition, correlation analysis 
shows that risk aversion is significantly decreasing in the education level of the respondents, and 
again significantly negatively related to the score from the risk profiling questionnaire, in both 
2007 and 2008. Risk aversion is significantly lower for males than for females in the 2008 
survey and significantly lower for people with higher income households in 2007. 
 [Insert Table 8 here] 
Estimated Latent Class Preference Model 
In addition to direct inference, we estimate the preferences (investment choices) of survey 
respondents using a latent class model where discrete but unobserved classes of participants have 
different preferences. Conventional latent class models allow preference parameters to vary 
between groups of investors but restrict the scale parameter of the random utility error to be fixed 
at one for all classes, possibly confounding preference variability and differences in underlying 
variability (Louviere & Eagle 2006; Fiebig, Keane, Louviere & Wasi 2009). Here we relax the 
restriction that the scale parameter is fixed across the whole population (Magidson and Vermunt 
2005) and estimate the latent classes for both preferences (investment choices) and scale (choice 
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variability). Class memberships are allowed to be functions of demographic covariates. A 
detailed description of the modeling approach is set out in Appendix 2.  
It turns out that preference classes in our estimated models identify some interesting 
distinctions based on age and income, and that general variation in response (scale class) may be 
linked to underlying risk tolerance and age. 
Fitted model and estimation results: We fitted the latent class model (Latent GOLD 
software version 4.5; Magidson and Vermunt 2005) to the ‘most likely’ (best) choices, using all 
demographic and personal characteristics to select classes for innate variability and underlying 
preferences. We estimated models for increasing numbers of latent scale and preference classes, 
selecting the preferred model using the Bayesian Schwartz information criteria (BIC), which 
rewards improved fit but penalizes additional parameters.
11
  
Likelihood ratio tests of the restriction of model constancy across 2007 and 2008 are 
clearly rejected, indicating that the changed financial environment and/or sampling variations 
have a significant effect on model parameters. Although the class and variability structures of the 
two models are estimated as similar, we observe a greater level of general variability in the 2008 
responses, and significant differences in the choices of some latent class groups, so we present 
results from each model separately.  
Scale classes - variance heterogeneity: Variance heterogeneity in the estimated model is 
explained by age and the risk score from the risk profiling questionnaire (Table 9). The BIC 
model selection criterion indicated two scale classes where λ₁=1 (by normalization) and 2,2007̂
=3.37, 2,2008̂ =4.00, implying that the first group show three or four times more variability in 
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underlying response than the second group, and that variability of the high variance group was 
higher during the 2008 survey but membership size was similar. We estimated the scale factors 
using the multinomial logit model where the vector of covariates is comprised of an indicator for 
age and the individual’s score from the risk profiling questionnaire.
 12
 Tests indicated that other 
demographics were irrelevant. Results are set out in Table 9 showing that the high variability 
groups are more likely to be younger (with a lower score on the risk profile in 2007), whereas the 
low variability groups were older. Interestingly, the risk profiling score was irrelevant to scale 
class groupings in the crisis period sample of 2008, demonstrating a weaker connection between 
risk profiling and choice consistency during financial stress.  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
Latent classes – preference heterogeneity: Preference class composition is partly 
explained by age and household income, but as noted above, estimates are not constant between 
2007 and 2008. The BIC model selection criterion indicated seven latent classes where class 
membership is a function of a constant, an indicator for age, and an indicator for household 
income. Other demographic and experience covariates were not significant when included as 
predictors in the latent class estimation. Estimation results for the multinomial logit latent class 
model is set out in Table 10 and Figure 1 shows the posterior prediction of scale and preference 
class membership by number of respondents. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
In the 2007 calm period sample, preference classes 2 and 7 are more likely to include 
people under 25 years whereas people in classes 3, 4 and 5 are likely to be 45 years and over. 
Class 1 includes low income respondents and classes 4 and 5 includes high income respondents, 
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whereas classes 3 and 4 have a significant chance of including those who refuse to report their 
income. Nearly half the sample is classified as members of classes 4 and 5 and over one quarter 
are in classes 2 and 7. Classes 2, 3 and 7 have a greater proportion of high-variability 
respondents than classes 1, 4, 5 and 6 (Figure 1). 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
In the 2008 crisis period, sample class membership is less distinct. Classes 2 and 7 are 
again more likely to be younger, but this time the 45-65 years group is more likely to fall into 
class 4 and the 25-44 years group into class 5. We find significant income effects for classes 4 
and 5 (both higher income) and in classes 2 and 6, lower income. Classes 1 and 3 are estimated 
as distinct preference classes but their membership cannot be described using significant co-
variates. However, the signs of estimated coefficients indicate an older-age membership in class 
3 and an older, lower-income membership in class 1. The proportion of the sample in each of the 
two scale and seven preference classes are similar to the 2007 estimates (Figure 1). 
Estimated preferences: The latent class model results allow us to estimate preferences for 
each underlying class in the sample separately, holding underlying response variability (scale) 
constant.  We use the preference parameters to estimate the probability that the member of a 
particular preference and scale class will choose investment options 1 to 6, where the 
conditioning information is the fee (net return of the portfolio) and the range (portfolio variance) 
of each option.  
Table 11 shows the conditional logit estimates of choice parameters over risk and return. 
The top panel of Table 11 shows the underlying drivers for these choices in the calm of 2007 and 
the second panel shows coefficients for the crisis period of 2008. We also can compute posterior 
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probabilities that members of each preference class choose particular options. The graphs in 
Figure 2 show (for the high variability scale class with λ=1) the implied choice probabilities for 
each investment option conditioning on preference for the calm and crisis period surveys. In both 
calm and crisis, results for the low variability class were similar but show choice probabilities 
more concentrated at the most preferred option for each preference group. 
 [Insert Table 11 here] 
In the calm of 2007, older respondents preferred high share exposures in general, and the 
higher income group of older respondents tend to choose the class with 75% shares. Classes 
which include more young respondents divided into a conservative group (class 2) who prefer 
mainly cash (75:25 cash/shares mix) and a more risk tolerant group (class 7) who prefer equity 
weights above 50%. The low income groups were most likely to choose the very conservative 
options of 100% cash (class 1) and the RSA (class 6). 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
In 2008 most of these patterns remained. Older, higher income groups (classes 4 and 5) 
still chose options 4 and 5 with share exposures at 75% or 100%. Low income groups 
(preference classes 2 and 6) preferred conservative options (75% cash or RSA). Younger 
respondents again divide into cash-preferring and share-preferring groups (classes 2 and 7). 
Overall, in both surveys, riskier choices are associated with older age and higher income 
and options with higher cash allocations with younger and lower income respondents. 
Marginal effects: Our model allows us to estimate marginal changes in choice 
probabilities with respect to changes in net return and portfolio variance. Consistent with the risk 
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parameters we inferred from the observed investment choices, analysis of marginal effects shows 
that a significant group of respondents make risk loving choices, and only a subset choose 
consistently with mean variance theory, preferring higher returns and lower risk. 
Table 12 shows the change in the probability of choosing an investment option given a 
one percentage point (100 basis point) increase in the net annual return and a five percentage 
point (500 basis point) increase in the annual volatility of that investment option. Only 
significant marginal effects are reported. The bold typeface indicates the investment option most 
often chosen by the relevant preference class. For example, in the calm of 2007, (under 
preference class 2) if the net return to the 75:25 cash:shares option rises by one percentage point, 
the probability that members of class 2 will choose that option rises by 12%. Similarly if the 
volatility of the 75:25 option rises by five percentage points, class 2 members are 8% less likely 
to choose it. 
There are some surprising results here. Looking at 2007, we see first that preference class 
1 responds negatively to higher returns. In other words, when the fees went up (and net returns 
fell), this group of low income respondents were more likely to choose the 100% cash option. A 
similar reaction is evident for preference class 6 which is the group who most often chose the 
bank account. In addition, no significant marginal effect was estimated for risk for these classes 
(about 4% of the sample) suggesting that they both always choose a conservative portfolio and 
do not consider risk and return at all. By contrast, the two preference classes inhabited 
predominantly by younger people, classes 2 and 7 (26% of the sample) do as theory predicts and 
prefer higher returns, but dislike risk, with class 7 reacting very negatively to increased risk. 
Thirdly, the older and higher income members of preference classes 4 and 5 tend to risk loving 
choices. The probability that they choose an option increases as the range of possible returns 
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widens and the class 5 group react very positively to more risk. Class 4 includes about one fifth 
of the sample, and class 5 around one third of the respondents, implying that around half the 
sample make risk loving choices. Finally, class 3, which has 15% of respondents, seems to prefer 
the 50:50 option, responding to higher returns, but largely unresponsive to changes in risk. 
Analysis of the marginal effects for the 2008 crisis sample suggest that the underlying 
behavioral themes stay fairly constant with consistent mean-variance preferences for the latent 
classes with more young respondents and risk-loving choices for the older higher income 
individuals. Classes 4 and 5 appeared slightly less favorable to increased risk, and class 7 
somewhat less risk averse. 
 [Insert Table 12 here] 
Cross effects: The structure of the latent class model also allowed us to estimate cross-
effects; the percentage change in the probability of choosing an investment option given a 
change in net return or variance for one of the other investment options. Table 13 sets out a 
subset of these cross effects – that is, those relating to the investment option that is most 
commonly chosen by each preference class, marked in the table by the double asterisks. 
Nearest options are frequently viewed as substitutes. Members of preference class 2, for 
example (mainly young respondents) tended to prefer higher returns and less risk, choosing the 
75:25 cash to shares weighting most. Column 2 in Table 13 shows that members of class 2 
regard the 100% cash and 50:50 portfolios as substitutes for their preferred 75:25 option, 
lowering their probability of choosing the 75:25 portfolio by 3% when the 50:50 portfolio net 
return increases by one percentage point. In 2007, this substitution effect with the next-nearest 
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portfolio is evident for preference classes 2-4 and 7 for returns. In 2008, the cross-effect in 
returns shows up for classes 2, 4, 5 and 7 though the sign is unexpectedly positive for class 7. 
A similar comparison applies to variance cross-effects but this time the sign of the effect 
is conditional on whether the preference class makes risk averse or risk loving selections. In the 
2007 survey, there are significant positive variance cross-effects with the next-nearest portfolio 
for class 7, which displays risk aversion, so that if the nearby portfolio is riskier, the respondent 
substitutes toward the asterisked option. There are significant negative variance cross-effects for 
classes 3, 4 and 5, showing that these respondents are more likely to move away from the 
asterisked option if the variance of the nearby portfolios rises. The 2008 model shows 
consistently-signed nearby variance cross-elasticities for classes 1, 4, 5 and 7. But substitution 
effects are generally smaller in 2008. 
[Insert Table 13 here] 
Discussion 
Individual retirement savings accounts are vulnerable to large financial shocks, as the 
recent crisis has shown. Here we have investigated the effect of a switch from tranquil (early 
2007) to crisis (late 2008) conditions on risk attitudes of, and allocation decisions by, retirement 
savers using a repeated choice experiment.  
Pre-screening of survey respondents showed little change in risk indicators between the 
tranquil and crisis periods, with almost identical scoring on a financial planners’ risk profiling 
questionnaire. Similarly, observed experimental choices showed a continued strong, though 
somewhat moderated, preference for riskier investments in the crisis period of 2008. Best 
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choices allocated to options with 75% or more in shares fell to 53% in 2008, from over 60% in 
2007, largely in favor of the 50:50 allocation, and the 100% share option attracted 6 percentage 
points more worst choices. 
Risk parameters inferred from best and worst choices for a subset of respondents 
indicated most were risk-seeking during both the calm of 2007 and the financial crisis of 2008, 
although both best and worst choice showed an increase in the mean risk parameter in 2008, over 
2007. Interestingly, the correlation between inferred risk preferences and the questionnaire 
scores was significant and negative for both best and worst choices, indicating that many 
respondents exhibited stated preferences at odds with their risk profiles. 
Despite similarities, likelihood ratio tests of the restriction of estimated latent class model 
constancy are clearly rejected, indicating that the changed financial environment and/or sampling 
variations have a significant effect. The 2008 estimated model showed a greater level of general 
response variability. Age and income are important determinants of preference class (and 
therefore investment choices) for both models, while variability (scale) was determined largely 
by age and (in 2007) risk tolerance. The risk score (obtained from the risk profiling 
questionnaire) is irrelevant to scale class groupings in 2008, suggesting a weaker connection 
between risk profiling and choice consistency during the period of financial stress. 
Preferred choices by preference class membership were similar. Classes populated by 
older and high income retirement savers tended to choose the riskier options, while low income 
and younger groups preferred the high cash options. However, in the 2008 crisis period the 
young risk tolerant group modified its preference away from 100% stocks.  
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The underlying behavioral impacts indicated by the estimated marginal effects were very 
similar in both periods, with older and high income classes making risk-seeking choices and 
young respondents choosing consistently with mean-variance theory, with a slightly lower 
response to increased risk by older and high income respondents evident in the 2008 crisis 
period. Estimation of marginal cross effects indicate significant substitution effects (with the 
next-nearest investment option on the choice menu) for most preference classes in both periods, 
with a smaller effect in 2008, indicating less substitution with options with similar risk-return 
characteristics during the financial crisis. 
Overall, comparing results between the relatively tranquil asset market conditions of early 
2007, and the full-blown financial crisis of late October 2008 suggests a mild moderating of risk 
tolerance, with a slight decrease in the preference for higher share weightings. 
Despite the slight moderation in risk tolerance in the crisis period, the observed choices 
and inferred risk preferences for both periods indicate higher risk tolerance than suggested by the 
risk profiling questionnaire completed by each respondent, and a greater preference for high 
share-weighting investment options than seen in practice - although experimental studies indicate 
that greater risk aversion in relation to real world decisions should not be surprising (Vlaev, 
Stewart & Chater 2008). The asset allocation of the typical Australian retirement saver tends to 
comprise around 65% risky assets (APRA 2009), while 63(53)% of ‘best’ choices in the 
2007(2008) sample were allocated to options with 75% or more in shares. 
There are a number of explanations for this result. It is possible that the respondents with 
high risk tolerance may be motivated by wealth and human capital characteristics for which we 
have incomplete information. For example, the respondents may be homeowners, have no 
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household debt and have valuable stocks of low risk human capital motivating high exposure to 
risk (Viceira 2007). 
Another factor driving our results could be experimental design. In our experiment the 
investment choices were restricted to a retirement savings account and 5 cash/shares portfolios 
ranging from 100% cash to 100% shares. Since we limited the investment choices to ‘long only’ 
investments (as does the Australian retirement savings system) some respondents may have 
found the 100% shares portfolio a binding constraint and preferred more risk than offered on the 
investment choice menu. Other possibilities include that some wealthier participants may have 
viewed the $1,000 contribution as small relative to wealth or income and decided that 
speculation with a small additional amount is optimal (Shefrin and Statman 2000); or that the 
hypothetical $1,000 contribution is a ‘windfall’ and therefore part of a different mental account 
to current income (Shefrin and Thaler 1988).  
Finally, a key feature of our experimental design which may be important is the 
presentation of risk as a range of terminal wealth values in terms of best and worst case 
scenarios. This presentation differs from typical risk presentations in retirement savings fund 
prospectuses which tend to emphasize downside risk only, but was found to be the best risk 
presentation in Vlaev et al. (2009). We plan to investigate the presentation of key investment 
choice decision tools such as menu composition, risk presentation and links to retirement saving 
accumulations and other wealth in future work. 
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Appendix 1: Survey Introduction 
We would like you to think about having $1,000 to invest in your superannuation fund. 
The $1,000 might come to you as a tax refund, a bonus, an inheritance, a small lottery prize, or 
perhaps you find an envelope with cash in it. You are required to choose the way your money is 
invested from a menu of investment options. We are going to show you 16 scenarios for your 
superannuation investment. The scenarios differ by the range of possible returns on your 
investment in each option and the fees you have to pay to the people managing your investment. 
What we want you to do is simple. In each scenario, tell us: 
    •   Which investment option you would be most likely to choose; and 
    •   Which investment option you would be least likely to choose. 
 The accumulation in the superannuation fund will be available to you to help fund your 
retirement once you have reached the age at which government regulations allow you to use 
money from your superannuation account. This will be somewhere between 55 to 60 years, 
depending on your current age. 
Investment Options 
We will offer you a menu of six investment options. The six options include five options 
made up of different combinations of "cash" and "Australian shares". Australian shares is an 
investment in the Australian stock market. Cash is an investment in the short term money 
market. The sixth option is a "Retirement Savings Account", which is similar to an ordinary bank 
account. 
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To help you make your choices we will give you information about past performance and 
fees for each of the six options. 
As you probably are aware, however, past performance does not guarantee future results. 
Performance and Investment Risk 
Each investment option has a different expected accumulation (the amount that your 
$1,000 will probably grow to over 10 years), and a different amount of investment risk (variation 
in the amount your investment grows). Different proportions of Australian shares usually result 
in different accumulations and risk. Historically, Australian shares have produced a higher 
return, but more investment risk compared with cash. Some years, share investments gain value 
rapidly, but some years they lose value. A Retirement Saving Account pays a fixed interest rate 
that is much lower than you should expect from investing in "cash" without any year by year 
variation. 
In each scenario, for each investment option, you will see the expected (average) 
accumulation after the next 10 years, based on past experience of the Australian money and share 
markets. All dollar amounts are quoted in "real terms". That means they are adjusted for inflation 
and measured in 2007 dollars. The dollar amounts are totals before fees are deducted. 
You will also see the likely amount of investment risk for each investment option by the 
range of the accumulation in your superannuation account after 10 years. The accumulation 
range is expressed as "likely worst case accumulation value after 10 years" and "likely best case 
accumulation value after 10 years". As before, these dollar amounts are based on past experience 
and are in 2007 dollars, without fees deducted. 
RETIREMENT INVESTOR RISK TOLERANCE IN CRISIS AND CALM 
 
 32 
Investment Management Fees 
Fees will be charged for investing your superannuation. 
The investment management fee is a fee for managing the investment in your 
superannuation account. Investment management fees range from 1.75% per year to 2.60% per 
year and depend on the investment option you choose. There are no investment management fees 
on the Retirement Savings Account. 
Now, we will show you 16 scenarios that contain the six investment options. Please 
evaluate each scenario carefully before making a choice about where to invest your $1000. 
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Appendix 2: Modelling and Estimation Approach 
In a McFadden (1974) conditional logit model, the random utility of choosing investment 
option j for individual i is 
* *




ij  is i.i.d. extreme value with variance ((π²)/(6λ²)), where λ is a scaling factor commonly 
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where *  . The variance scaling factor λ and preference parameter vector *  are always 
jointly estimated, so interpretation depends on the normalization chosen for λ. In a finite mixture 
model such as we estimate here, if we allow the preference parameters *  to vary between latent 
classes of investors, but restrict λ=1 for all classes, then there is always a danger of interpreting 
differences in β by class as due to *  when they are caused by differences in λ. 
In a generalized latent class model,
xiii
 the random utility of option j for individual i is 
dependent on the latent preference class q=1,...,Q and the unobserved scale parameter class d , 
d=1,...,D inhabited by individual i. (We normalize one scale parameter to one and interpret the 
others as ratios to the normalized value.) The probability of choice j by individual i in choice 
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For simplicity we write 
| , Pr[ | , ].it q d itP y j class q scale d     
If each of the t=1,...,T choice events are independent, then the contribution of the 
individual i to the overall likelihood, conditioning on class and scale is 
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  (A2.7) 
We assume that there are Q discrete latent classes and D scale groupings, but that class 
membership is hidden. The best estimated models in our study have Q=7 latent preference 
classes and D=2 scale groups, and we allow for the classes to be determined using a set of 
observable characteristics or demographics. If 
|iq dH is the prior probability for class q for 
individual i and 
|iq dG  is the prior probability for scale group d, then the multinomial logit model 
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The vector iz  includes k=1,...,K relevant covariates and/or demographic characteristics of 
individual i including a constant. In our estimated models, the set of demographics ( iz ) is 
comprised of indicators for the age and household income of respondents, and their risk score 
from the risk profiling questionnaire. These demographics decide the composition of the 7 latent 
preference and 2 scale classes, but in the final models reported in Tables 9 and 10 not all of these 
demographic variables are selected. 
To ensure complete allocation of all individuals to a preference and scale class, we have 
, 0k qq   and , 0k dd    . If none of the variables in iz  are relevant, then the |q dH  and dG  
reduce to a Q(D)-vector of constants which sum to one. Combining these together, the overall 
log likelihood is 
RETIREMENT INVESTOR RISK TOLERANCE IN CRISIS AND CALM 
 
 36 
| | , | | ,
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ln ln ln ln
Q Q TN N D N D
i id iq d i q d id iq d it q d
i i d q i d q t
L P G H P G H P
       
   
     
   
      . (A2.9) 
Estimation of the parameters of the model is by numerical maximization of the log 
likelihood. Following the Latent GOLD default estimation process, we use 10 randomized sets of 
starting values and small Bayes constants to try to ensure that an identified global maximum is 
reached. We choose the number of preference and scale classes using the Bayesian Information 
Criterion, BIC=lnL+(model size lnN)/(lnN). 
The posterior probability that an individual belongs to preference class q can be inferred 
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Another restriction of the conventional conditional logit model is that of the independence 
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) where an increase in the odds of choosing a particular option j 
implies a proportional decrease in all other probabilities, so that odds ratios not directly impacted 
by the changes for option j stay constant. In other words the model treats all alternatives as 
proportionately substitutable, and does not allow for different degrees of substitutability and 
complementarity. This seems unlikely where the alternatives include choices that are close 
substitutes as is the case in our experiment. Consequently a real advantage of the latent class 
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model here is that IIA does not hold: in equation (A2.9) all variables appear in the probability 
| ,it q dP , including those of different alternatives. 
The marginal effect on individual i's choice probability for option j in choice situation t 
due to a change in attribute m in option w is 
 
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       (A2.12) 
which can be averaged across individuals and choice sets.  
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Note: Graphs show estimated average probability P(j|q,d) of choice of investment option j for each preference 
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TABLE 1 Demographic and personal characteristics, % of sample 
Characteristic 2007 2008 Characteristic 2007 2008 
Gender                            Occupation              
Female 50 49 Professional 24 20 
Male 50 51 Manager 10 12 
Age                       Administrator 9 10 
18-24 years 14 12 Small business owner 6 6 
25-34 years 31 25 Sales 6 5 
35-44 years 23 22 Clerical/service worker 12 12 
45-54 years 19 20 Transport worker 2 2 
55-64 years 13 10 Labourer 3 4 
65 years and over 0.2 0 Tradesperson 4 5 
Marital status                     Home duties 12 11 
Single 28 25 Retired 7 7 
Living with partner 9 9 Unemployed 5 4 
Married/de facto 54 57 Household income                 
Widowed 2 2 >$40,000 15 14 
Separated/divorced 7 8 $40,001-$90,000 36 35 
Children under 18    - Yes            41 42 $90,001-$150,000 24 24 
Age of children             $150,001-$210,000 7 9 
0-2 years 31 31 $210,001-$240,000 1 1 
3-5 years 28 26 Over $240,000 3 2 
6-9 years 31 34 Prefer not to say 15 15 
10-14 years 39 33 Homeowner 56 55 
15-18 years 27 30 Car owner 88 89 
Education          Investment property 19 17 
Some secondary 8 9 Non retirement investment   
4 years secondary 11 10 Yes 68 68 
High School Graduate 17 17 No, but considering 25 23 
Technical/trade certificate 20 24 No, not interested 7 9 
University (undergraduate) 27 24 Non retirement shares   
Other college 7 4 Yes 43 41 
University (postgraduate) 11 13 No, but considering 41 31 
Employment status        No, not interested 16 28 
Full time 52 52 Property 23 20 
Part time 21 20 Shares 42 41 
Not working 22 24 Managed funds 21 20 
Full time student 5 4 Savings accounts 80 82 
   Attitudes to risk    
   Conservative 2 3 
   Moderately conservative 18 17 
   Balanced 76 76 
   Moderately aggressive 4 4 
   Aggressive 0 0.2 
Note: Demographic characteristics and risk profiling survey responses of sample of 819 individuals in 
March 2007 and 919 individuals in October 2008 from PureProfile web panel.
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TABLE 2 Attribute levels 











Range of terminal 
wealth values 
1 1450-2000 1300-3050 1100-4000 800-8400 600-15800 1140 
2 1500-1850 1500-2450 1350-3400 1200-4700 1000-6250 1140 
3 1550-1800 1600-2350 1550-3150 1400-4100 1300-5350 1140 
4 1600-1750 1700-2200 1750-2800 1700-3500 1700-4300 1140 
Portfolio standard  1 1.7% 5.1% 8.2% 12.7% 17.4% 0% 
deviations p.a. 2 1.5% 3.7% 7.0% 10.3% 13.9% 0% 
 3 1.2% 3.2% 5.8% 8.8% 11.5% 0% 
 4 0.8% 2.23% 4.1% 6.3% 8.0% 0% 
Returns        
10 yr value in 
dollars 
 $1675 $1950 $2250 $2550 $2800 1140 
Rate of return p.a.  5.3% 6.9% 8.4% 9.8% 10.8% 1.3% 
Less return on RSA  4.0% 5.6% 7.1% 8.5% 9.5% 0% 
        
Investment 1 1.75% 1.90% 1.85% 2.25% 2.20% 0% 
management 2 2.00% 1.95% 2.00% 2.30% 2.30% 0% 
fees 3 2.10% 2.10% 2.20% 2.35% 2.40% 0% 
 4 2.20% 2.15% 2.30% 2.40% 2.60% 0% 
        
Portfolio return 1 2.25% 3.70% 5.20% 6.25% 7.30% 0% 
p.a. net of fees 2 2.00% 3.65% 5.10% 6.20% 7.20% 0% 
 3 1.90% 3.50% 4.90% 6.15% 7.10% 0% 
 4 1.80% 3.45% 4.80% 6.10% 6.90% 0% 
Note: Returns and ranges are inflation-adjusted. For the retirement savings account (RSA), the return is the 
compound average % p.a. return from the Commonwealth Bank Retirement Savings Account Product Disclosure 
Statement, adjusted for taxes and inflation (account balance $1000<$5000) and the terminal value has zero risk. 
Risk levels are taken from a bootstrap of historical returns and are the range of final values of $1000 investment 
after 10 years, min-max, 5-95th, 10-90th and 20-80th quantile ranges rounded to the nearest $50. Standard 
deviations were computed by truncating each bootstrapped empirical distribution at the required range, and then 
computing the annualized standard deviation for the truncated distribution. The `expected' outcomes are the 50th 
quantiles for each option. Return is the median expressed as a real annualized percentage and net of the 1.3% fixed 
return on the retirement savings account. The last four rows show the implicit levels of net returns when 
management fees for each investment option are deducted.
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TABLE 3 Choice set template 
Which of the following options are you most likely to choose when considering investment 
options? 
Please tick ONE BOX for most likely and ONE BOX for least likely 














Key Features after 10 years       
Likely worst case accumulation $1450 $1500 $1550 $1700 $600 $1140 
Expected (average) accumulation $1675 $1950 $2250 $2550 $2800 $1140 
Likely best case accumulation $2000 $2450 $3150 $3500 $15800 $1140 
Investment management fee (% p.a.) 1.75% 1.95% 2.20% 2.40% 2.20% 0% 
1. Which investment option would you 
















2. Which investment option would you 



















Note: Table shows one example of an investment choice set offered to survey participants. Each participant 
chose most and least likely choices from 16 of these tables where the levels of investment management fees and 
likely `worst' and `best' case accumulation after 10 years varied over four levels for each option apart from the 
retirement savings account.   




TABLE 4     Observed choices of most likely (best) and least likely (worst) options 
2007 Investment option  
 100% 
cash 
75:25 50:50 25:75 100% shares RSA total 
best         
choices 700 1411 2536 3920 4300 237 13104 
proportions  0.05 0.11 0.19 0.30 0.33 0.02  
odds ratio RSA 2.95 5.5 9.5 15 16.5   
worst        
choices 1904 533 588 753 1630 7696 13104 
proportions 0.15 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.59  
odds ratio RSA 0.25 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.20   
2008 Investment option 
 100% 
cash 
75:25 50:50 25:75 100% shares RSA total 
best         
choices 1097 1896 3448 4014 3798 446 14699 
proportions  0.07 0.13 0.23 0.27 0.26 0.03  
odds ratio RSA 2.46 4.25 7.73 9.00 8.52   
worst        
choices 1852 528 606 866 2574 8273 14699 
proportions  0.13 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.18 0.56  
odds ratio RSA 0.22 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.31   
Note: Upper rows show the observed number and proportion of best/worst investment choices for each option from 
the raw survey data along with the observed odds ratio relative to the retirement savings account (option 6), for 2007 
survey. Lower rows show the same for 2008 survey. The 819 (919) respondents made selections from 16 choice sets 
generating 13104 (14699) observations each of `most likely' and `least likely' investment choices. In 2008, one 
respondent selected from 11 rather than 16 choice sets producing a total of 14699 rather than 14704 responses.  
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TABLE 5  Risk parameter inference example: best choices 
Investment 
option 
6 1 2 3 4 5 selected 
RSA cash 75:25 50:50 25:75 shares max min 
set best + - + - + - + - + - + - + - 
17 5 746 172 171 28 27 9 8 3 2 2 1 -30 1 -30 
18 4 746 172 171 45   44 11 -3 -30 10 -2 -3 -30 
19 5 746 172 171 31 30 12 11 7 6 2 1 -30 1 -30 
20 5 746 172 171 30 29 20   19 3 2 -30 2 -30 
21 5 746 152 151 36 36 8 7 5 4 2 1 -30 1 -30 
22 4 746 152 151 42   41 4 -7 -30 3 -6 -7 -30 
23 5 746 152 151 41 40 17   16 1 0 -30 0 -30 
24 5 746 152 151 40 39 19   -9 -30 18 -8 18 -8 
25 5 746 663 662 13   12 10 9 4 3 -30 3 -30 
26 5 746 663 662 39   38 9 8 2 1 -30 1 -30 
27 4 746 663 662 21     -2 -30 10 -1 -2 -30 
28 5 746 663 662 14 13 8 7 6 5 1 0 -30 0 -30 
29 5 746 254 253 94 93 17     16 -30 16 -30 
30 5 746 254 253 91 90 29 28 4 3 2 1 -30 1 -30 
31 5 746 254 253 105 104 8 7 5   4 -30 4 -30 
32 4 746 254 253 102 101 3 5 3   2 -30   
Inferred range for risk parameter: -7 -8 
Note: Table gives an example of the 16 choice sets and ‘best’ or most preferred choices of one respondent in the 
2008 survey and values of 2η for which investment options 1-6 will generate maximum utility Vij if the respondent 
behaves consistently with a mean-variance utility function. Each choice made by the respondent implies the range 
for 2η in the min-max columns, and the smallest intersection between these ranges is set out in bold in the lower 
right hand cells of the table. We infer that this respondent behaves consistently with absolute risk `aversion' between 
-8 and -7. 
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TABLE 6  Summary statistics and histogram: risk preferences for most 
preferred choices 
 2007 2008 
 lower upper midpoint lower upper midpoint 
mean 21 33 27 59 85 72 
median -2 0 -1 -1 0 -0.5 
maximum 746 745 745.5 745 746 745.5 
minimum -30 -29 -29.5 -30 -29 -29.5 
std. dev 113 124 117 175 198 186 
observations 122 122 122 108 108 108 
Note: Table shows summary statistics for cross-section of inferred risk parameters using consistent `best' choices 
from 2007 and 2008 surveys. We report the upper and lower bounds and midpoints of the interval (2ηij⁺2ηij
-
)∗  
whenever the risk parameter ranges imply a consistent intersection. 
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TABLE 7  Risk parameter inference example: worst choices 
Investment 
options 
6 1 2 3 4 5 selected 
RSA cash 75:25 50:50 25:75 shares max min 
set best + - + - + - + - + - + - + - 
17 6 -30 4         5 746 -30 4 
18 6 -30 11       12 746   -30 11 
19 6 -30 7         8 746 -30 7 
20 6 -30 10         11 746 -30 10 
21 6 -30 7         8 746 -30 7 
22 6 -30 7       8 746   -30 7 
23 6 -30 4         5 746 -30 4 
24 6 -30 15     16 18 19 746   -30 15 
25 6 -30 11         12 746 -30 11 
26 6 -30 7         8 746 -30 7 
27 6 -30 7       8 746   -30 7 
28 6 -30 4         5 746 -30 4 
29 6 -30 20     21 325   326 746 -30 20 
30 6 -30 4         5 746 -30 4 
31 6 -30 10         11 746 -30 10 
32 6 -30 7         8 746 -30 7 
Inferred range for risk parameter: -30 4 
Note: Table gives an example of the 16 choice sets and `worst' or least preferred choices of one respondent in the 
2008 survey and values of 2η for which investment options 1-6 will generate minimum utility Vij if the respondent 
behaves consistently with a mean-variance utility function. Each choice made by the respondent implies the range 
for 2η in the min-max columns, and the smallest intersection between these ranges is set out in bold in the lower 
right hand cells of the table. We infer that this respondent behaves consistently with absolute risk `aversion' between 
-30 and 4.  
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TABLE 8  Summary statistics and histogram: risk preferences for least 
preferred choices 
 2007 2008 
 lower upper midpoint lower upper midpoint 
mean -10 155 72 5 205 105 
median -30 4 -13 -30 4 -13 
maximum 326 746 536 326 746 536 
minimum -30 4 -13 -30 4 -13 
std. dev 62 296 168 88 328 194 
observations 538 538 538 607 607 607 
Note: Table shows summary statistics for cross-section of inferred risk parameters using consistent `worst' choices 
from 2007 and 2008 surveys. We report the upper and lower bounds and midpoints of the interval (2ηij⁺2ηij
-
)∗  
whenever the risk parameter ranges imply a consistent intersection. 
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TABLE 9  Multinomial logit estimation of scale factor groups (D = 2) 
 2007 2008 
 Class 1, λ = 1 Class 2, λ = 3.37 Class 1, λ = 1 Class 2, λ = 4.00 
 coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient 
Intercept 0.663* -0.663* 0.279 -0.279 
age: under 24 0.144* -0.144* 0.249* -0.249* 
age: 25-44 -0.007 0.007 -0.081 0.081 
age: 45-65 -0.137* 0.137* -0.169* 0.169* 
Risk Score (/100) -1.657* 1.657* -0.189 0.189 
% of sample 54 46 57 43 
     
Note: Estimation results of the probability that an individual is a member of each scale class where higher values of 
λ indicate less variability. *p < 0.1. 
.
RETIREMENT INVESTOR RISK TOLERANCE IN CRISIS AND CALM 
 
 53 
TABLE 10  Multinomial logit estimation of preference classes (Q = 7)  
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 Class 6 Class 7 
2007 
% of sample (posterior) 2 17 15 20 34 2 9 
Intercept -1.188* 0.727* 0.272* 0.350* 1.141* -1.345* 0.043 
age: under 24 0.160 0.278* -0.629* -0.357* -0.221 0.108   0.662* 
age: 25-44 0.137 -0.326* 0.301* -0.011 0.025 -0.025 -0.102 
age: 45-65 -0.297 0.048 0.328* 0.368* 0.196 -0.083  -0.560* 
income≤40k 0.614* -0.210 -0.257 -0.119 -0.275* 0.467 -0.220 
income>40k -0.066 -0.043 -0.068 0.496*  0.205* -0.553*    0.029 
Income unreported -0.548 0.254 0.326* -0.378* 0.070 0.086 0.191 
2008 
% of sample (posterior) 7 14 17 17 29 3 13 
Intercept -0.575* 0.399* 0.362* 0.135 0.673* -1.099* 0.105 
age: under 24 -0.390 0.431* -0.142 -0.172 -0.176 -0.041 0.489* 
age: 25-44 0.125 -0.148 -0.012 -0.164 0.175* -0.115 0.140 
age: 45-65 0.265 -0.283* 0.154 0.336* 0.001 0.156 -0.630* 
income≤40k 0.065 0.314* 0.051 -0.403* -0.319* 0.323 -0.031 
income>40k -0.106 -0.089 0.050 0.391* 0.356* -0.796* 0.194 
Income unreported 0.041 -0.226 -0.101 0.012 -0.037 0.474* -0.162 
 
Note: Estimation results of the probability that an individual is a member of each preference class. *p < 0.1. 
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TABLE 11  Conditional logit estimation of choice parameters by preference 
class 
2007 
 Estimated coefficient 
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 Class 6 Class 7 
net return        
100% cash -2.664* 0.772* 0.901 -0.334 -5.742* -2.683* 4.057* 
75:25 c/s -1.409 0.547* 2.401* -2.83* -2.833 -1.288 0.782 
50:50 c/s 1.307 0.481* 0.485* 0.545* 1.969*  2.448* 0.434* 
25:75 c/s -5.599 -0.819 -0.884 0.075 2.439* -1.583 1.536* 
100% shares -1.056 0.884 3.248* 0.112 0.082 -0.115 0.277 
variance        
100% cash 1.725 -2.600 16.995 15.000 60.723 30.714 -35.417 
75:25 c/s -0.658 -0.587* 2.000* 5.024* -4.066 -3.402 0.136 
50:50 c/s 0.365 -0.110 0.115 1.299* 1.688* -0.873 -1.430* 
25:75 c/s 7.619 -0.333* -0.116 0.340* 1.446* 0.151 -1.047* 
100% shares 1.287 -0.130 -0.076 0.342* 0.414* -0.066 -0.769* 
constant        
100% cash 3.272* 0.208* -1.493* -1.771* -2.289* -0.419* -1.914* 
75:25 c/s 1.641* 0.965* 1.066* -0.322 -1.589* -0.202 0.558* 
50:50 c/s 0.711 0.555* 2.493* 1.365* 0.535* -0.144 1.144* 
25:75 c/s -3.619 -0.037 1.571* 2.386* 2.209* -0.242 1.532* 
100% shares -1.326 -0.524* 0.191 1.425* 3.059* 0.039 1.634* 
 
Note: * p <0.1.  
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TABLE 11 (cont) Conditional logit estimation of choice parameters by 
preference class 
2008 
 Estimated coefficient 
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 Class 6 Class 7 
net return        
100% cash -0.585 0.637* 1.376 -1.724 -2.378 -1.955* -1.782 
75:25 c/s -1.264 0.219 0.627 1.220 2.181 -1.136 -0.179 
50:50 c/s -1.303 0.288* 1.136* 0.315* 1.940* 0.360 0.315* 
25:75 c/s 0.441 0.957 1.252 0.0.583 1.907* 2.224 -0.324 
100% shares -1.320 -0.290 3.325* -0.059 0.531* -5.225* 0.555* 
variance        
100% cash 0.899 4.225 -136.973* -58.053 24.915 73.822* 43.443 
75:25 c/s -2.756* -0.527* 0.647 3.107 4.793* -1.081 0.004 
50:50 c/s 1.278 -0.379* -0.210 0.755* 2.163* -0.578 -0.541* 
25:75 c/s -1.027* -0.076 -0.121 0.284* 1.209* -0.123 -0.460* 
100% shares -0.312 0.085 -0.309 0.791* 0.368* 0.149 -0.392* 
constant        
100% cash 2.014* 0.191* -2.037* -1.428 -1.747* -0.242 -1.011* 
75:25 c/s 0.840* 0.949* 1.267* 0.509 -1.024* -0.186 0.353* 
50:50 c/s -0.383* 0.386* 2.406* 2.704* 0.361* 0.075 0.765* 
25:75 c/s -0.484* -0.150* 1.110* 3.468* 1.795* -0.364* 0.958* 
100% shares -0.599* -0.437* -0.576* 1.585 2.490* -0.694* 0.864* 
 
Note: *p < 0.1.  
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TABLE 12 Marginal change in choice probabilities by preference class 
2007 Significant marginal effect, λ = 1 
Attribute Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 Class 6 Class 7 
net return        
100% cash -0.52 0.11   -0.03 -0.25 0.05 
75:25 c/s  0.12 0.29 -0.11    
50:50 c/s  0.09 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.28 0.07 
25:75 c/s     0.51  0.33 
100% shares   0.19 0.00    
variance        
100% cash        
75:25 c/s  -0.08 0.15 0.12    
50:50 c/s    0.18 0.08  -0.21 
25:75 c/s  -0.05  0.10 0.36  -0.27 
100% shares    0.09 0.15  -0.27 
2008  
net return        
100% cash  0.09    -0.20  
75:25 c/s        
50:50 c/s  0.05 0.27 0.06 0.14  0.06 
25:75 c/s     0.41   
100% shares   0.11  0.13 -0.38 0.11 
variance        
100% cash   -0.69   2.81  
75:25 c/s -0.26 -0.07   0.05   
50:50 c/s  -0.05  0.13 0.14  -0.08 
25:75 c/s -0.06   0.08 0.31  -0.11 
100% shares    0.12 0.14  -0.12 
Note: Table shows the change average probability P(j|q,d) of choice of investment option j for each preference class, 
where scale λ=1, given a 100 basis point (1 percentage point) increase in net return j or a 500 basis point (5 
percentage point) increase in annual portfolio volatility for portfolio j. Estimated effects with p-values of 0.1 or less 
are reported and effects for the most preferred investment option for each class are in bold typeface. 
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TABLE 13 Marginal change in choice probabilities, cross-effects by preference 
class 
2007 Significant marginal effect λ = 1 
Attribute Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 Class 6 Class 7 
net return        
100% cash ** -0.05    0.09  
75:25 c/s  ** -0.23 0.08 0.02   
50:50 c/s  -0.03 ** -0.06 -0.02 -0.11 -0.05 
25:75 c/s    **   -0.04 
100% shares  -0.04 -0.07  **  ** 
RSA      **  
variance        
100% cash **       
75:25 c/s  ** -0.09 -0.07    
50:50 c/s   ** -0.12 -0.05  0.09 
25:75 c/s  0.01  ** -0.32  0.14 
100% shares    -0.06 **  ** 
RSA      **  
2008  
net return        
100% cash ** -0.04    0.11  
75:25 c/s  **      
50:50 c/s  -0.02 ** -0.05 -0.09  0.01 
25:75 c/s    ** -0.34  ** 
100% shares   -0.07  ** -0.09 0.03 
variance        
100% cash **  -0.03   -1.56  
75:25 c/s 0.20 **   -0.06   
50:50 c/s   ** -0.11 -0.19  0.03 
25:75 c/s 0.04   ** -0.26  ** 
100% shares    -0.08 **  0.05 
Note: Table shows marginal change in probability of choosing the most preferred investment (j) for each scale class, 
P(j|q,d), for a 100 basis point (1 percentage point) increase in annual net return to investment option i or a 500 basis 
point (5 percentage point) increase portfolio volatility (annual standard deviation) for option i. The most probable 
choice for each preference class is indicated by two asterisks. Results for scale class λ=1 and estimated cross effects 
with p-values of 0.1 or less are reported.  
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1
 Bateman et al. (2009) gives an econometric analysis of a sub-sample of results for the 2007 survey. Here we 
include a full sample of respondents for both the 2007 and 2008 surveys, including individuals who did not provide 
household income data and other new results on risk parameters. 
2
 Like many risk profiling questionnaires, this questionnaire used by one of Australia’s largest financial service 
providers, AMP, was not tested or calibrated (see Yook and Everett 2003), but published in consumer information 
for investment products and in generally use by industry practitioners. As a result we report the results of the risk 
profiling questionnaire with caution. We did not inform respondents of their scores during the survey.  
3
 Average household earnings in 2007-08 were around $80,000 AUD. 
4 While the $1000 may seem trivial in isolation, the survey introduction prompts the respondents to think about the 
contribution in conjunction with their (existing) superannuation (pension) fund and retirement accumulation, rather 
than as a one-off amount. The $1000 contribution is hypothetical and clearly a small amount for many retirement 
savers, however, the literature does suggest a close relationship between revealed and stated preferences (surveyed 
in Louviere, Hensher and Swait 2000, Chapter 13 
5
 A retirement savings account is a product offered by an Australian financial services provider as an alternative to a 
superannuation (pension) fund. It pays a fixed, net of fees, interest rate, which is generally lower than one would 
expect from investing in a ‘cash’ option from a pension fund investment option menu. 
6
 The major types of fees on superannuation accumulation accounts could include: 1) Contribution fees (4-4.5% of 
all contributions), charged to open the account and on all later contributions. 2) Management or investment fees, 
linked to chosen investments and varying from manager to manager. They may include additional performance fees, 
and/or rebates on larger. 3) Administration or member fees, charged as a percentage of the account balance or as a 
fixed fee but sometimes bundled with investment management fees. 4) Switching investment options or other 
transactions by members, sometimes including a fee on the termination of the account. 5) Ongoing payments to 
advisers as part of the investment agreement. 
7
 Return and risk attributes for each option are bootstrapped from a sample of monthly time series running from July 
1986 to March 2006 of the JP Morgan Australian Cash 12 months total return index (DataStream JPAU12L~A$), 
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end-month and the Australia-DS Market total return index (DataStream TOTMKAU(RI)), end-month. We deflated 
using the ABS Private Consumption Deflator, quarterly, linearly interpolated to monthly frequency. Bootstrapped 
monthly returns are accumulated to 10 year gross returns. 
8 Note that the last four variables also change with attribute level, but we do not index again so as to keep the 
notation simple. 
9
 More specifically portfolio option j=6. 
10
 In 2008, one respondent selected from 11 rather than 16 choice sets producing a total of 14699 rather than 14704 
responses. 
11
 We report only the best models below but preliminary model estimations are available from the authors on 
request. 
12
 Hallahan, Faff and McKenzie (2003) show that similar psychometric risk profiling scores can themselves be 
related to demographic characteristics including income, age and gender. Preliminary ordinal regression of risk 
scores on demographics by respondent showed that very low and very high income significantly predicted the risk 
score (low incomes associated with low scores and vice versa) and similarly for education where a university degree 
predicted high scores and a secondary education or less predicted low scores. We do not report these results here but 
they are available from the authors on request. 
xiii
 In some respects this description follows Greene and Hensher (2003). 
